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Abstract
Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common perperiod payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability
that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage.
Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action
at every period according to his posterior beliefs. At the end of each round
of play, the true current state is verifiable. The distinctive assumption
of the paper is that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of
the expert’s reliability: he considers the expert’s true forecasts as the
outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. The paper shows
that the expert will have instrumental reputational concerns, related to
the future estimate of the systematic error associated to his predictions. In
contrast with previous work, reputational concerns are shown to enhance
the credibility of the initial messages, and to increase both the agents’
expected payoff at the first round of play in equilibrium. The equilibrium
messages will be noisy, but noisiness will be less costly than it would be
in single-stage games.
Key words: opinion, expert, strategic communication
JEL codes: D81, D84
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Introduction

Many decisions depend on trusting someone. Trust matters especially when a
decision-maker is uncertain about some event of interest and asks for advice to
someone else called expert. In order to put the advice to use, the very first
choice of the decision-maker will concern his subjective assessment of the reliability that he judges to be typical of the honest opinions of the expert. Indeed,
∗ Address: Department of Statistics, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, via Bicocca
degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy, email: irene.valsecchi@unimib.it
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a decision-maker could not even approach the problem of strategic communication on the expert’s side if he did not know how to deal with straight messages.
The reliability of an honest advice may not be obvious when the expert makes
predictions and the decision-maker has little substantive knowledge of the factors affecting the uncertain event of interest. For instance, the decision-maker
may not be aware of the specific process of information extraction connecting
signals and beliefs according to the expert. In that case honest forecasts are not
reliable per se. The decision-maker may take messages as being truthful and
biased at the same time: they can report the opinion of the expert faithfully,
and still be subject to some systematic error. The repeated interaction between
a decision-maker and an expert of uncertain reliability is the concern of the
present paper.
In particular, I consider a simple model of strategic communication between
two agents, who play a two-stage cheap-talk game. The agents have the same
preferences and aim at maximizing the undiscounted sum of the single-period
payoffs of their joint activity. At every round of play the decision-maker is
uncertain about the current and binary state of nature, that is identically and
independently distributed across time. The expert is a probability assessor
and is supposed to believe in the validity of his own predictions. At every
stage the expert forms his belief and sends to the decision-maker a message.
Having received the message, the decision-maker updates his probability that the
current state is low. Then, the decision-maker takes an action that determines
the state-contingent single-period payoff, common to both the agents.
Recurring to the statistical literature on the expert problem, the distinctive
assumption of the paper is the following: the decision-maker makes a subjective
assessment of the honest forecasts of the expert. In particular, the decisionmaker takes the expert’s true beliefs as the realizations of an experiment with
an unknown parameter η. That parameter is a measure of the systematic error
in the predictions of the expert. So the expert’s true beliefs are considered
to be the outcomes of a random variable having a probability density function
conditional on the true state and the unknown parameter η. At the initial stage
the decision-maker believes the parameter η to be a drawing from some prior
distribution function of η with support in the closed unit interval of the real
line.
At the end of the first stage, both the agents observe the true current state
of nature, and the decision-maker revises his measure of the statistical bias of
the expert. At the second round the same stage game is played again with
new beliefs and a new message, action and state. The paper focuses on perfect
Bayesian equilibria. The equilibrium properties will be valued with respect to
the agents’ expected payoffs, not with respect to information transmission, since
reputation in only subjectively assessed by the decision-maker.
The paper shows that the expert will not reveal his beliefs truthfully in
equilibrium at the last round of play. At period 2 the decision-maker’s best
action will be proportional to his posterior probability that the current state
is low. Since the agents share a common single-period payoff, if they hold
a common belief that the current state is low, they will agree to the optimal
2
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current action. However, when the decision-maker cannot rule out the possibility
of an honest expert being biased, even in the case of genuine reports, the singleperiod payoff expected by the agents will be different, as well as their best
action. So at each round of play the single-period payoff expected by the expert
will decrease in the distance between his true belief and the decision-maker’s
posterior probability that the current state is low. If the decision-maker expects
honest messages, the expert will have an incentive to send dishonest messages.
Strategic communication will work in the following way: if the expert is more
confident that a high state occurs, he will announce a probability that the
current state is high greater than his true belief; if the expert is more confident
that a low state occurs, he will announce a probability that the current state
is low higher than his true belief. In other words, the expert will exaggerate
his reports in order to lead the decision-maker to believe what he believes. The
worse is the reputation of the expert in the decision-maker’s mind, the less
reactive will be the decision-maker to messages. As a result, the distortion in
the announced probability will be stronger, and the loss expected by the expert
will be higher.
At each round the expert will choose a message rule, that is a probability
density function of message mt conditional on his belief pt . The paper shows
that in equilibrium the support of the final message rules of the expert will be
a finite partition of the closed unit interval of the real line. Unlike the usual
outcomes of cheap-talk games, equilibria are proved to exist for every finite
cardinality of the equilibrium partition at period 2. The reason is that in the
present paper the main problem is the conflict of opinions between the agents:
the decision-maker will choose an action that can be higher or lower than the
expert’s unconstrained best action. That "non-monotonic" conflict between
the agents is essential in yielding the result of no finite upper bound to the
equilibrium partitions at the second stage.
In equilibrium the expert’s incentive to misreport will reduce both the agents’
final expected payoffs. At the final stage of play both the agents would be better
off if the expert could commit to some message rules the support of which were
a finite partition different from the equilibrium one. Moreover, the equilibrium
final payoff expected by the expert at the end of period 1 is shown to depend
on the final bias expected by the decision-maker. Hence, the message that the
expert chooses to send at period 1 will have both a direct effect on his expected
current payoff, and an indirect effect on his future reputation and his expected
future payoff.
The paper shows that honest initial reports cannot be supported in equilibrium for every equilibrium profile at the final stage of play. As far as the expert’s
final reputation is concerned, the paper shows the following. If the true state at
period 1 is low and the expert has induced the decision-maker to have a lower
probability that the initial state is low, the expert’s reputation at period 2 will
be worse than it would have occurred if he had induced a higher probability.
The opposite will obtain if the true state at period 1 is high. Moreover, if the
expert induces the decision-maker to have a low probability that the initial state
is low, his future reputation will improve with respect to the expected current
3
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bias only if the true state at period 1 is high.
Instrumental reputational concerns at period 1 are shown to imply a tradeoff between two conflicting purposes: a) the maximization of the initial payoff
expected by the expert, and b) the minimization of the future loss expected by
the expert when his reputation falls. In equilibrium the expert’s reputational
concern at period 1 will partially offset his incentive to misreport at the first
round of play. In other words, instrumental reputational concerns will enhance
the credibility that the decision-maker can associate to the first-period messages.
Consequently, the equilibrium payoff at period 1 expected by both the agents
will be higher in repeated games than in single-stage games. In equilibrium
all the agents will gain from reputational concerns. That result is in contrast
with recent contributions showing that reputational concerns will impair the
equilibrium welfare properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the
related literature, and, in Section 3, I describe the assumptions and the basic
model. Section 4 is concerned with the equilibria properties at the last stage of
play. Section 5 focuses on the equilibrium reports at the first round of play. In
Section 6, I conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2

Related Literature

In the economic literature professional advice is often analyzed by way of models
of asymmetric information. At least two agents are interested in the value of
some parameter or state of the world θ. Only one agent, called expert, is going
to observe some new data Y . All the parties agree upon the parameter space,
the space of the realizations of Y and the conditional distribution of Y given
θ for all possible values of θ (Bayarri-DeGroot (1991)). The consensus upon
the distribution of Y conditional on the unknown parameter makes expertise a
special instance of private information to be revealed according to the rules of
strategic communication1 .
In particular, the quality of information exchanged in equilibrium2 is a major
concern in cheap-talk games, along the path initiated by Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Ex-ante an agent called sender has observed the value of a random
variable, that can be modelled as the sender’s type. The sender sends a message
to a receiver. The receiver takes an action that determines the welfare of both
the agents, jointly with the sender’s type. The sender is a "partisan" expert
because he is better informed than the decision-maker, and because he has
preferences over actions, typically different from the decision-maker. Messages
are not verifiable and are "cheap" because their transmission is free of any direct
1 A different approach to the issue of professional advice is taken by the contributions
concerned with credence goods. In that case, fraud and cheating are the major problems
in the interaction between experts and consumers (for an extensive review, see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006)).
2 In principal-agent relationships optimal delegation can be an effective susbtitute to inefficient mechanisms inducing disclosure of private information (for instance, Demski-Sappington
(1987), Li-Suen (2004) and Alonso-Matouschek (2008)).
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cost. Equilibria are shown to involve noisy messages because the expert engages
in strategic information communication. The present paper takes from Crawford
and Sobel the idea of a partisan expert: the expert’s expected payoff will depend
on the action taken by the decision-maker. However, while in Crawford and
Sobel truthful messages will be sent in equilibrium when the interests of the
agents coincide3 , in the present paper noisiness will persist under solidarity in
equilibrium.
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a) consider a professional expert concerned
about appearing to be well informed about the current state of the world. Exante the expert knows his ability, otherwise unobservable. During the game
only the expert observes a private signal generated by a multiplicative linear
experiment. In such experiment the ability of the expert is the measure of the
amount of information that is encoded in the signal. After observing the signal,
the expert is free to publicly report any message. At the end of the period an
evaluator combines the message from the expert with the ex-post realization of
the state to update the belief regarding the ability of the expert. That posterior
belief is the reputation of the expert that determines his final payoff. So the
correspondent cheap-talk game is static and the expert is perfectly indifferent to
the current use of his report. The expert’s reputational concern is shown to be
incompatible with truthful messages in equilibrium. In particular, if the prior is
already concentrated on any particular state, the expert will always wish to bias
his report in the same direction. The present paper shares with Ottaviani and
Sorensen the idea that reputational concerns can matter; however, the concern
for reputation will descend endogenously from the expert’s desire to be believed
in his repeated interaction with the decision-maker4 .
Credibility in repeated rounds of information transmission is analyzed by
Sobel (1985) for a case in which the receiver must decide whether to trust the
sender, whose motives are uncertain. If the sender is a friend, he will share the
same preferences of the receiver; if he is an enemy, his best action will be the
opposite of the decision-maker’s best action. Sender and receiver interact for
a finite number of times. At the beginning of every stage, the agents observe
a random variable that measures the importance of that current round. Only
the sender observes the value of a binary random variable, that is independently and identically distributed across time. Then the sender sends a message
to the receiver, who takes a decision affecting the welfare of both the agents.
The players maximize the undiscounted sum of their single-period payoffs. The
agents’ single-period payoff depends on the distance between action and signal.
The sender’s best action will be the signal if he is a friend, while it will be
the opposite of the signal if he is an enemy. Repeated interaction between the
agents, coupled with verifiable information at the end of each period of interaction, is shown to make it worthwhile for the receiver to build a reputation
3 Crawford and Sobel show that the amount of information revealed in equilibrium will
increase as the preferences of the sender and the receiver become more aligned.
4 Contributions concerned with either the relative evaluation of many esperts (OttavianiSorensen (2006b, 2006c), Scharfstein-Stein (1990)) or multiple signals about the same state
of the world (Li (2007), Prendergast-Stole (1996)) are less closely related to this paper.
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for truthfulness5 . In equilibrium the sender typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods. An enemy will eventually take advantage of
the receiver by misleading him and losing all opportunities for deception in the
future. The present paper shares with Sobel the idea of a repeated interaction
between expert and decision-maker, both interested in the maximization of the
undiscounted sum of the single-period payoffs. However, the uncertainty about
the expert’s preferences is replaced by the decision-maker’s uncertainty about
the expert’s ability as a probability assessor. Moreover I will consider two-stage
games only.
In S. Morris (2001) an informed advisor wishes to convey his valuable information to an uninformed decision-maker in a two-stage cheap-talk game. The
decision-maker believes that the advisor may have preferences different from his
own, biased in favor of particular decisions. At every round, the advisor observes
a noisy signal of the current and binary state of the world, and sends a message
to the decision-maker. Having received the message, the decision-maker takes
an action from a continuum, affecting the welfare of both the agents. At the
end of the period the state is verified and the decision-maker updates his beliefs about the advisor’s preferences, given his message and the true state of the
world at the first period. Then the game is played again, with the same advisor
but a new state, signal, message and action. Here the advisor has no intrinsic
reputational concerns as in Ottaviani and Sorensen, but he has instrumental
reputational concerns, that arise exclusively from his desire to have his unbiased advice listened to in the future. Morris shows that the advisor will have a
reputational incentive to lie at the first stage, if he does not wish to be mistaken
for a biased expert. So, when reputational concerns are sufficiently important
relatively to the current decision problem, no information will be conveyed in
equilibrium at the first period. The present paper shares with Morris the idea
that an expert cares about his reputation instrumentally. Once again, the assumption of a conflict of interest between the agents is replaced by different
opinions over the probability that a particular state is realized.
While the economic contributions are mostly concerned with the strategic
reporting of predictions, it is the use of predictions that is paid particular attention by the statistical literature. French (1986) summarizes the expert problem
in the following way: a decision-maker needs to assess his subjectivity probability for an event θ of interest; having little substantive knowledge of the
factors affecting θ, the decision-maker asks another person for advice. An expert is anyone who can give predictions, i.e. anyone who can make probability
statements, called judgments or opinions, concerning the event of interest. The
problem is: how should the decision-maker incorporate the honest opinion of
an expert into his own? P.A. Morris (1974, 1977), Lindley et al. (1979), and
French (1980) suggest a Bayesian modeling approach to the use of experts6 .
The decision-maker should look upon the true opinion of the expert as a piece
of data: consulting an expert is like performing an experiment, and just as
5 Honesty
6 Related

in informal communication is further analysed by Olszewski (2004).
works are Morris (1983) and Genest-Schervish (1985).
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the results of an experiment are a priori unknown to the experimenter, so the
advice of the expert is uncertain to the decision-maker prior to receiving it. According to P.A. Morris (1974), the model of the expert in the decision-maker’s
mind is a likelihood function l (p (θ) | θ), that represents the probability of the
event that the expert’s prior is p (θ) given θ (not the probability of a probability in the classical sense)7 . The likelihood function l (p (θ) | θ) summarizes the
decision-maker’s subjective measure of the expert’s reliability8 . Consequently, a
distinction is required between the meaning of an honest probability assessment
to the decision maker and the expert himself: the expert looks at his probability
assessment as the reflection of his own information, the decision-maker takes the
expert’s true opinion as information itself. The present paper borrows from the
statistical literature the idea that the decision-maker has his own model of the
true opinions of the expert. Further, it makes an attempt to reconcile it with
strategic behavior on the expert’s side, that is typical of the economic literature.
The role of probability assessor played by the expert in the present paper
is quite close to the spirit of Harris and Raviv (1993). They consider a population of agents who receive public information but interpret that information
differently. That is, it is common knowledge that people have different opinions and believe in the validity of their own judgements. In the present paper,
differences of opinions in the population of experts are not analyzed, but they
can be consistent with a decision-maker who can only appraise subjectively how
much reliable the forecasts of an expert are, when that expert is drawn from a
population of opinionated agents.
Finally, the issue of trust between decision-maker and expert can be related
to the issue of leadership. In Hermalin (1998) leadership is distinguished from
authority because following a leader is a voluntary, rather than coerced, activity of the followers. In particular, in Hermalin leadership is the capacity of
the leader to induce rational agents to exert effort when the leader can have
incentives to mislead them. But leadership can spring also from the high regard
into which subordinates take the competence of a manager. When subordinates
receive instructions beyond their scope of direct observation or understanding,
they will face the same situation of a decision-maker weighting the opinion of
an expert. In this sense, while the theory of yes-men of Prendergast (1993) is
7 Morris

(1974, p.1238):

Suppose a decision maker is considering the weather to determine the
prospects for a picnic. His view is that there is a 50-50 chance of rain....While he
is waiting for the weather report he ponders how he will use the weatherman’s
advice. He first reason that the weatherman will state a probability of rain p...
The decision maker ... makes a subjective appraisal of the dependence between
the expert’s advice and the actual weather. Specifically, he asks himself what his
assessment of p would be if an honest clairvoyant told him that it will surely rain
on his picnic...For any given value of p he can calculate the posterior probability
of rain...
8 According to Lindley (1982), an expert is probability calibrated if the decision maker
adopts the expert’s opinion for his own. Other concepts of calibration are discussed by
DeGroot-Fienberg (1983).

7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 531 [2010]

concerned with the reliability that a manager expects to characterize the reports from his subordinates, a complementary issue can regard the reliability
that subordinates expect to characterize the guidelines issued by their manager.

3

Set-up

For two periods a decision-maker and an expert, denoted by D and E respectively, are engaged in a joint activity. That joint activity yields a common payoff
at every period. The payoff at period t depends on the state of the world at
period t, denoted by ω t , and the action chosen at period t, denoted by at . Both
agents aim at maximizing the undiscounted sum of the per-period payoffs of
their joint activity.
At every period the state of the world can be either −1 (low state) or 1 (high
state). At every period the feasible action set A is the closed interval [−1, 1] of
the real line. The common payoff function at period t, denoted by πt (ω t , at ), is
the quadratic loss function, i.e.:
π t (ω t , at ) = − (ω t − at )2

(1)

Then a best action is always implementable for every expected current payoff.
At the beginning of every period the expert makes an assessment of the
probability that the current state is low. Let pt denote the expert’s true belief
that ω t is low, with pt in the closed unit interval of the real line, denoted by
I. During period t the expert sends a message, denoted by mt , to the decisionmaker. Every message mt belongs to I and can be interpreted as the expert’s
announced probability that the current state is low. Having received mt , the
decision-maker updates his probability that ω t is low, and chooses the current
action at .
The beliefs of the expert are assumed to satisfy the following conditions9 :
a) a belief pt is formed at period t before any message mt is sent; b) if the
expert has belief pt , pt will represent his degree of confidence in the event "ω t
is low", i.e. the expert believes pt to be unbiased; and c) at period (t − 1) the
expert expects that in the future he can have any belief pt in I with positive
probability. For simplicity, it is assumed that the prior joint probability density
2
function (p.d.f.) of p1 and p2 is represented by [f (p)] , where f (p) is the uniform
p.d.f.. Hence, the final beliefs of the expert are stochastically independent from
his initial beliefs.
The decision-maker believes that each state occurs with equal prior probability, and that the states are stochastically independent across time. The
decision-maker considers the true beliefs of the expert as the realizations of an
experiment with an unknown parameter labelled η. In particular, the decisionmaker considers the true belief pt of the expert as the outcome of the random
variable Pt in the sample space I, having a p.d.f. conditional on the true state
9 The process by which the expert comes to have his beliefs is not modelled. The main
reasons are the following: a) different experts may have different opinions, and b) the decisionmaker is unaware of the inferences that an expert can make.

8

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper531

8

Valsecchi: Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decis

and the unknown parameter η. Moreover, the decision-maker believes that the
true beliefs of the expert at different times form a random sample: provided the
true states ω 1 and ω 2 are equal to ω, the true beliefs P1 and P2 are i.i.d. with
common likelihood function l (p | ω, η).
The parameter η is assumed to belong to the closed unit interval of the real
line. The likelihood functions related to the lowest and the highest parameters
are the following:
l (p | −1, 0) = 2p = l (1 − p | 1, 0) ∀p ∈ I
l (p | −1, 1) = 1 = l (p | 1, 1) ∀p ∈ I

(2)

When η is zero, the likelihood of p, conditional on a low (high) state, is linearly increasing (decreasing) in p. When η is the highest, the likelihood of p
conditional on state ω is uniform. For every parameter η in (0, 1) the likelihood
function l (p | ω, η) is assumed to be the following:
l (p | ω, η) = (1 − η) l (p | ω, 0) + ηl (p | ω, 1)

ω = −1, 1

(3)

i.e. the likelihood function l (p | ω, η) is a linear mixture of the experiments
characterized by the extreme values that η can take. The parameter η is a
measure of statistical bias for the following reason. Let u (−1 | p, η) denote the
decision-maker’s posterior probability that ω is low conditional on p and η, i.e.:
u (−1 | p, η) =

l (p | −1, η)
l (p | −1, η) + l (p | 1, η)

(4)

That is, u (−1 | p, η) would be the decision-maker’s posterior belief that the
current state is low, if messages could not be other than honest, and if the
decision-maker believed that the expert’s forecasts were characterized by parameter
η with certainty. From (2)-(3), if ηj > ηi , then | p − u (−1 | p, η i )| ≤



p − u −1 | p, ηj  for every p in I. In other words, the lower is η, the smaller
will be the distance between the decision-maker’s posterior beliefs and the expert’s true beliefs. The higher is η, the greater will be the correction deemed to
be right by the decision-maker over the expert’s forecasts. The decision-maker
would adopt the honest opinions of the expert for his own if he were certain
that η is equal to 0 (i.e. the expert is reputed to be perfectly calibrated). The
decision-maker would be indifferent to the expert’s reports if he were certain
that the expert is perfectly unreliable (i.e. η = 1). It follows that the parameter η measures the systematic error that affects the true beliefs of the expert
according to the decision-maker.
To sum up, the uncertainty of the decision-maker is substantial for two
reasons. First, the decision-maker cannot be more uncertain about the current
state than at the beginning of every period, since his prior probability that
the current state is low is 0.5. Second, the decision-maker looks at the expert
as a source of forecasts with a systematic and unknown error represented by
the parameter η. At the initial period the decision-maker believes the expert’s
parameter η to be a drawing from the distribution function (d.f.) G1 of η, with
9
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corresponding generalized probability density function10 (g.p.d.f.) g1 of η on
I. It is assumed that under the g.p.d.f. g1 of η both the expected value of η,
denoted by η1 , and the variance of η, denoted by σ2 , exist. The support of
g1 (·), denoted by H1 , is assumed to be non-singular in (0, 1] 11 . After action
a1 has been implemented, both the common payoff and the state at period 1
are realized and publicly observed. Then the game is played again by the same
agents with new predictions and a new state, a new message, a new g.p.d.f. of
η and a new action.
All aspects of the game except (p1 , p2 ) are common knowledge. The game
solution concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.

4

Message Rule for One Period Ahead

I begin the analysis with a discussion of the last stage. Let g2 (η) be the short
notation for the g.p.d.f. of η conditional on ω 1 and m1 , with support denoted
by H2 and corresponding expected bias denoted by η2 . The expert will choose
a period-2 message rule that is
 a g.p.d.f. of m2 conditional on his true belief p2 ,
denoted by µ(m2 | p2 ), with I µ(m2 | p2 )dm2 = 1. Let β (m2 | p2 ) denote the
decision-maker’s
period-2 belief that the expert announces m2 , conditional on

p2 , with I β(m2 | p2 )dm2 = 1. Finally, let ν (m2 ) denote the decision-maker’s
period-2 posterior probability that ω2 is low, conditional on message m2 , i.e.:
 
l (p2 | −1, η) β (m2 | p2 ) g2 (η) dp2 dη
ν (m2 ) =   H2 I
(5)
H2 I [l (p2 | −1, η) + l (p2 | 1, η)] β (m2 | p2 ) g2 (η) dp2 dη

For brevity, sometimes I will call ν (m2 ) the decision-maker’s induced posterior
belief, meaning that it is the posterior probability that ω 2 is low to which
the decision-maker is lead by the expert sending m2 . The decision-maker will
choose a period-2 action
 rule that is a g.p.d.f. of a2 conditional on m2 , denoted
by α (a2 | m2 ), with A α(a2 | m2 )da2 = 1.
In equilibrium:
a) if µ
(m′2 | p2 ) > 0, then m′2 solves maxm2 EE [π2 (ω 2 , α
 (a2 | m2 )) | p2 ],
where EE [π2 (·) | p2 ] denotes the payoff at period 2 expected by the expert
having belief p2 ;
b) if α
 (a′2 | m2 ) > 0, then a′2 solves maxa2 ED [π2 (ω2 , a2 ) | 
ν (m2 )] where
ED [π2 (·) | 
ν (m2 )] denotes the payoff at period 2 expected by the decisionmaker who
 has′ received message m2 ; ′
 ′2 | p2 ) for every p2 .
c) if I µ
(m2 | p2 )dp2 > 0, then µ
(m2 | p2 ) = β(m
Conditions a) and b) describe a Nash Bayesian equilibrium at period 2.
Condition c) says that the decision-maker’s period-2 beliefs {β (m2 | p2 )}, and,
consequently, his posterior probabilities {ν (m2 )} are to be consistent with the
expert’s period-2 message rules in equilibrium.
1 0 The adjective "generalized" is used in order to deal with a d.f. of η that can be a discrite
distribution, a continuous distribution or a mixture of the two.
1 1 Otherwise the d.f. of η could be degenerate.
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The following Proposition shows that the decision-maker will never adopt
mixed strategies at period 2. Moreover, the expert will not report his true beliefs
in equilibrium at the final stage of play.
Proposition 1 : the decision-maker’s best action 
a2 conditional on m2 is a
strictly monotonic function of ν (·). Provided η2 ∈ (0, 1), truthtelling will never
be the expert’s period-2 equilibrium message rule.
Truthtelling cannot be supported in equilibrium at period 2 for the following
reason. The decision-maker’s best final action depends on his posterior probability that the current state is low. When the decision-maker expects the expert to
be honest but biased, the decision-maker’s induced posterior belief will typically
be different from the belief of that honest expert. If the agents show different
degrees of confidence in the event "the current state is low", they will disagree
about the expected single-period payoff, and the best action to implement. Consequently, the single-period payoff expected by the expert will be decreasing in
the distance between his true belief and the decision-maker’s induced posterior
belief. In other words, the expert will have an interest in leading the decisionmaker to believe what he believes. When the decision-maker conjectures that
the messages are honest, the expert will misreport in order to squeeze the gap
between his true belief and the decision-maker induced posterior belief.
In particular, misreporting will work in the following direction: if the expert believes that a high state is more likely (i.e. p2 > 0.5), he will send a
message m2 higher than p2 ; instead, if the expert is confident that a low state
will occur, he will announce a probability m2 lower than p2 . In other words, if
the decision-maker believes that the reports are honest, the expert will exaggerate his announcements in order to make the decision-maker’s induced posterior
probability closer to his true belief. Moreover, given two distribution functions
of η, G′2 and G′′2 , if the d.f. G′2 dominates the d.f. G′′2 in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance, then the decision-maker’s induced posterior beliefs will
be less reactive to the messages sent by the expert under the d.f. G′2 than under
the d.f. G′′2 . As a result, the worse is the reputation of the expert, measured
by the bias expected by the decision-maker, the stronger will be the intensity
of misreporting.
From Proposition 1 the decision-maker’s posterior probability ν (m2 ) cannot be a continuous function of m2 in equilibrium at the final stage of play.
Now, in order to characterize period-2 equilibria with non-continuous posterior
probabilities {ν (m2 )}, I need to proceed in the following way:
1) fix a g.p.d.f. g2 of η and a system of period-2 beliefs {β (m2 | p2 )} of the
decision-maker that generate n2 different posterior probabilities {ν (m2 )}. Let
Vn2 denote
the correspondent ordered
set of period-2 posterior probabilities, i.e.


Vn2 = ν i | ν (i−1) < ν i < ν (i+1) .
2) Once a set Vn2 has been specified, let P (Vn2 ) denote the set of the elements
{Yi } defined in the following way:
Yi = {p2 | |p2 − ν i | ≤ |p2 − ν j |

∀ν j ∈ Vn2 \ν i }

(6)
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By construction, ∪Yi = I. From the proof of Proposition 1, if p2 belongs to Yi ,
then the payoff at period-2 expected by the expert with belief p2 from inducing
ν i will not be lower than the payoff at period-2 expected by the same agent
from inducing any other ν j (i.e. EE [π2 (ω2 , 
a (ν i )) − π 2 (ω 2 , 
a (ν j )) | p2 ] ≥ 0
for every ν j ∈ Vn2 \ν i if p2 ∈ Yi , where 
a (ν i ) stands for the decision-maker’s
best final action conditional on message m2 inducing ν i ).
The following Proposition shows that equilibria at the final stage of play
always exist. In particular:
Proposition 2 :
a) provided η2 ∈ [0, 1), for every integer n2 there will be a unique period-2
equilibrium set Vn2 and a unique equilibrium set P Vn2 , that is a partition
with n2 elements, thereby simply denoted by Pn2 . For every n2 > 1, both Vn2
and Pn2 will be symmetric around 0.5. Vn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 1,
while Pn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 2.
b) Provided η 2 = 1, there will be a unique period-2 equilibrium set V1 and a
unique equilibrium set P V1 with V1 = 0.5 and P V1 = I.

Proposition 2 shows that the equilibria at the final stage of play are partitional, similarly to the result of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Since the expert
believes in the validity of his own forecast, his reports will depend on his true beliefs only. In equilibrium every posterior probability 
vi in Vn2 can be computed
as if the expert chose a uniform message rule for every interval in the equilibrium
partition. The equilibrium sets Vn2 and Pn2 with more than one element are
shown to be symmetric around 0.5. Moreover, given an interval Yi = y(i−1) , yi


that belongs to the equilibrium partition Pn2 , its size (i.e. yi − y(i−1) ) will
be constant for every i only if the expert is reputed to be perfectly reliable.
Otherwise, the size of each interval Yi in Pn2 will be decreasing in i from 1 to
n2


2 . Consequently, both the equilibrium sets Vn2 and Pn2 will be function of the
bias expected by the decision-maker at the final stage of play.
Unlike the usual outcomes of cheap-talk games, Proposition 2 shows that an
equilibrium partition with cardinality n2 exists and is unique for every finite n2 ,
as long as the decision-maker does not expect the expert to be totally unreliable
(i.e. the g.p.d.f. g2 (η) is not degenerate on 1).The existence of an equilibrium
partition for every finite cardinality n2 is due to the following reason. The action
that the expert would freely choose (his unconstrained best action), and the
action that the expert both prefers and can actually induce the decision-maker to
make are usually different. That difference between the expert’s best action and
the expert’s preferred action within the decision-maker’s best actions at period
2 has not always the same sign in the present paper, as it occurs in Crawford
and Sobel instead. Cheap-talk games are often marked by some "monotonic"
conflict of interest between the agents: for every state of the world the expert’s
unconstrained best action is always higher or lower than the decision-maker’s
best action. In the present paper the problem lies with a conflict of opinions
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between the agents: the decision-maker will choose an action that can be higher
or lower than the expert’s unconstrained best action. That feature is essential in
yielding the result of no finite upper bound to the equilibrium partitions at the
second stage, in contrast with the outcomes of cheap-talk games à la Crawford
and Sobel.
Since an equilibrium exists for every finite cardinality n2 , the higher is the
number of messages to which the decision-maker associates a different posterior
probability that the current state is low, the finer will be the equilibrium partition at period 2. Thus, provided the expert is reputed to have some reliability at
period 2 (i.e. η2 < 1), multiple equilibria will prevail at period 2. Instead, if the
expert is reputed to be totally unreliable (i.e. η2 = 1), the unique equilibrium
will be the babbling equilibrium.
The following Corollary leads to show that at the end of period 1, fixed
the cardinality of the partition supporting the expert’s message rules, the final
payoffs expected by both the agents in equilibrium will never be the highest, if
n2 > 2 and η2 ∈ (0, 1). That is:
Corollary 1 : let Ei [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] denote the payoff at period 2 expected
by agent i at the end of period 1 when P (Vn2 ) is a partition with cardinality n2
and each vi in Vn2 is consistent with a uniform message rule for every interval
in P (Vn2 ). Provided η 2 ∈ [0, 1), Ei [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] will be maximized if the
size of every Yi is equal to n12 .
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show that at the final stage of play both the
agents would be better off if the expert could commit to message rules different
from the equilibrium ones, notwithstanding a partition with n2 elements. In
other words, in equilibrium the expert’s incentive to misreport will reduce both
the agents’ expected final payoffs.
n2 denote the unique couple of the equilibrium sets Vn2 and Pn2 .
Let R
n2 can be distinguished only with respect
Period-2 equilibria characterized by R
to the decision-maker’s beliefs {β (m1 | p1 )} for messages that are never sent by
the expert in equilibrium. The following Corollary is concerned with the relationship between the bias expected by the decision-maker at period 2 and the
payoff at the final stage expected by the expert at an equilibrium characterized
n2 .
by R

Corollary 2 : at the end of period 1, the future payoff expected by the expert
at every non-babbling equilibrium is strictly decreasing and concave in η2 .

Corollary 2 shows that, if n2 is greater than 2, the higher is the decisionmaker’s expected bias at period 2, the greater will be the size of Y1 and Yn2 in the
equilibrium partition Pn2 , while the the size of all the other intervals will squeeze.
As a consequence, every interval Yi in the equilibrium partition Pn2 with i =
{1, n2 }, will shift towards 0.5 as the reputation of the expert deteriorates. The
reason is that the expert’s incentive to induce the lowest or the highest posterior
beliefs, v1 or vn2 , will increase with the decision-maker’s expected bias at period
13
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2. At the end of period 1, the future payoff expected by the expert at every
non-babbling final equilibrium will decrease with the expected distance between
his true belief and the decision-maker’s induced posterior probability that ω2 is
low. Hence, the equilibrium future payoff expected by the expert at the end of
period 1 will increase if his reputation improves (i.e. η2 gets lower than η1 ).
Since in correspondence to every non-babbling equilibrium at period 2 the
expert’s expected payoff depends on η2 ultimately, the expert will have an instrumental reputational concern at period 1. The message that the expert chooses
to send at period 1 will have both a direct effect on his expected current payoff,
and an indirect effect on his expected future payoff. The direct effect comes
from message m1 bringing the decision-maker to choose a particular current action. The indirect effect comes from message m1 causing a positive or negative
change in the expert’s reputation, relevant for the second round of play.

5

Message Rules for Two Periods Ahead

The expert will choose a period-1 message rule that is ag.p.d.f. of m1 conditional on his true belief p1 , denoted by µ(m1 | p1 ), with I µ(m1 | p1 )dm1 = 1.
Let β (m1 | p1 ) denote the decision-maker’s
period-1 belief that the expert an
nounces m1 , conditional on p1 , with I β(m1 | p1 )dm1 = 1. Let g2c (η | ω1 , m1 )
denote the decision-maker’s posterior g.p.d.f of η at period 2, conditional on ω 1
and m1 , and consistent with β (m1 | p1 ), i.e.:

l (p1 | η, ω1 ) β (m1 | p1 ) g1 (η) dp1
c
(7)
g2 (η | ω 1 , m1 ) =  I
H1 I l (p1 | η, ω 1 ) β (m1 | p1 ) g1 (η) dp1 dη

with corresponding expected bias denoted by ηc2 (ω 1 , m1 ). Finally, let λ (m1 )
denote the decision-maker’s period-1 posterior probability that ω1 is low, conditional on message m1 , i.e.:
 
l (p1 | −1, η) β (m1 | p1 ) g1 (η) dp1 dη
λ (m1 ) =   H1 I
(8)
H1 I [l (p1 | −1, η) + l (p1 | 1, η)] β (m1 | p1 ) g1 (η) dp1 dη

The decision-maker will choose a period-1 action
 rule that is a g.p.d.f. of a1
conditional on m1 , denoted by α (a1 | m1 ), with A α(a1 | m1 )da1 = 1.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 2, a final equilibrium can depend on the
bias expected by the decision-maker at period 2. I underline that dependence
with the notation Rn2 (ηc2 (ω1 , m1 )). I restrict attention to profiles of period-2
equilibria characterized by cardinality n2 whatever the 
realized state at period
c
c
c



 cn denote the
1, i.e. Rn2 (m1 ) = Rn2 (η2 (−1, m1 )) , Rn2 (η2 (1, m1 )) . Let R
2

c
 n (m1 ) . In equilibrium:
set of the equilibrium profiles R
2


′
′
cn (m1 ) | p1 ,
a) if µ
(m1 | p1 ) > 0, then m1 solves maxm1 EE π 1 (ω 1 , α
 (a1 | m1 )) + π2 R
2
where EE [π1 (·) + π2 (·) | p1 ] denotes the sum of the payoffs expected by the expert who has belief p1 and sends message m1 , when the equilibrium final profile
 cn (m1 );
is R
2
14
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nc (m1 ) | λ (m1 ) ,
b) if α
(a′1 | m1 ) > 0, then a′1 solves maxa1 ED π1 (ω 1 , a1 ) + π2 R
2
where ED [π1 (·) + π2 (·) | λ (m1 )] denotes the sum of the payoffs expected by the
decision-maker who has received message m1 , when the equilibrium final profile
 cn (m1 );
is R
2

 ′ | p1 ) for every p1 .
c) if I µ
(m′1 | p1 )dp1 > 0, then µ
(m′1 | p1 ) = β(m
1
Conditions a) and b) describe a Nash Bayesian equilibrium at period 1.
Condition c) says that the decision-maker’s period-1 beliefs {β (m1 | p1 )} are to
be consistent with the expert’s period-1 message rules in
 equilibrium. It fol (m1 ) and the equilibrium
lows that the equilibrium posterior probabilities λ

c2 (η | ω 1 , m1 ) need be consistent with the
posterior distribution functions G
expert’s equilibrium initial message rules as well.
The following Lemma shows that the decision-maker will not adopt mixed
strategies even at period 1. Moreover, truthtelling at the first stage of play
cannot not be supported in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 : the decision-maker’s best action 
a1 conditional on m1 is a strictly
monotonic function of λ (·). Truthtelling will never be the expert’s period-1
equilibrium message rule.
Lemma 1 shows that at period 1 the decision-maker’s best actions will be
strictly decreasing in his posterior probability that the state at period 1 is low.
Moreover, the decision-maker’s best initial actions are independent from the
equilibrium partition at the final stage of play. Indeed, it is the expert’s future
reputation that links his expected payoff at period 1 with the his expected future
payoff, but the expert’s future reputation is independent from the decisionmaker’s initial action. Moreover, Lemma 1 shows that honest reports at period
1 cannot be supported in equilibrium for every equilibrium profile at the final
stage of play.
In order to characterize equilibria with non-continuous initial action rules, I
need to proceed in the following way. Fix a system of period-1 beliefs {β (m1 | p1 )}
of the decision-maker, that generates n1 different posterior probabilities {λ (m1 )}.
Let Ln1 denote
 the correspondent ordered
 set of period-1 posterior probabilities,
i.e.: Ln1 = λi | λ(i−1) < λi < λ(i+1) . The following Lemma shows that the
decision maker will expect the same bias at period 2 in correspondence to all
the different messages at period 1 that induce an equal posterior probability at
period 1, i.e.:
Lemma 2 : if λ (m′1 ) = λ (m′′1 ), then ηc2 (ω 1 , m′1 ) = ηc2 (ω1 , m′′1 ) for every ω1 .
If λ (m′1 ) > λ (m′′1 ), then η c2 (1, m′1 ) > ηc2 (1, m′′1 ) and ηc2 (−1, m′1 ) < ηc2 (−1, m′′1 )
Lemma 2 shows that there is a correspondence between the cardinality of
the set of the initial posterior probabilities {λi } and the cardinality of the sets
of the final expected biases. In other words, given Ln1 , there will be n1 different expected biases at period 2, conditional on each realized state ω1 . Let
ηc2 (ω 1 , i) denote the expected final bias conditional on ω 1 and any message m1
15
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 c (i) denote the period-2 equilibrium profile with cardinality
inducing λi . Let R
n2
n2 that would prevail if a message m1 inducing
λi were sent at period 1 (i.e.

c
c
c



Rn2 (i) = Rn2 (η2 (−1, i)) , Rn2 (η 2 (1, i)) ). Given a set Ln1 and the corre cn
 cn , let Q Ln1 R
sponding equilibrium set R
2
2
{Qi } defined in the following way:

Qi =











p1 | EE 

denote the set of the elements

n (ηc2 (ω1 , i)) +
π 1 (ω 1 , 
a1 (λi )) + π 2 R
2

n2 (ηc2 (ω1 , j))
−π1 (ω1 , 
a1 (λj )) − π 2 R
∀λj ∈ Ln1 \λi

≥ 0 | p1

 


 




(9)
where 
a1 (λi ) stands for the decision-maker’s best initial action conditional on
message m1 inducing λi . If p1 belongs to Qi in (9), then the sum of the payoffs
expected by the expert with belief p1 from inducing λi will not be lower than
the sum of the payoffs expected by the expert from inducing any other λj . By
construction, ∪Qi = I.
given the same set Ln1 , let Q1 (Ln1 ) denote the set of the elements
 1Finally,

Qi defined in the following way:
Q1i

=



p1 | EE [π1 (ω 1 , 
a1 (λi )) − π1 (ω 1 , 
a1 (λj )) ≥ 0 | p1 ]
∀λj ∈ Ln1 \λi



(10)

The set Q1 (Ln1 ) would be relevant if the agents played a single-stage game.
n1 , R
 cn can
The following Lemma shows that in equilibrium the set Q L
2
be a partition with n1 elements.

 cn ,
Lemma 3 : given i < j, if Qi and Qj are non-empty elements of Q Ln1 R
2
then any p1 in Qi cannot be higher than any p1 in Qj .

 cn is a partition with n1 elements, then
From Lemma 3, if the set Q Ln1 , R
2
every λi in Ln1 will be induced with positive probability, and
 vice versa. Let
c
n R
 c denote the equilibrium couple L

c


n1 , R
S
,
Q
L
,
R
, where Q L
n1
n1
1
n2
n2
n2
is a partition with finite cardinality n1 . From Proposition 2 there will be a
1n , Q
1n , denoted by S
1n . The following Propounique equilibrium couple L
1
1
1
sition shows that instrumental reputational concerns will never make the equilibrium initial payoffs expected ex-ante by the agents decrease.
Proposition
3 :

n1 R
 cn
a) Ei π 1 S
2
and/or n2 = 1;
n1 R
 cn
b) Ei π 1 S
2
n2 > 1.







1n
= Ei π 1 S
1

for every i = E, D if n1 ≤ 2



 1n
> Ei π1 S
for every i = E, D if n1 > 2 and
1
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Proposition 3 is concerned with equilibria characterized by an equilibrium
n , R
 cn that is partition with the same cardinality of the equilibrium
set Q L
1
2
 cn
n1 . In that case every Q
i in Q L
n1 , R
set L
2

is a proper interval q(i−1) , qi .

n and Q L
n , R
c
will be symmetMoreover, both the equilibrium sets L
1
1
n2
ric around 0.5. Proposition 3 shows that in equilibrium the posterior distribution functions of η can be ordered according to the criterion of first order
 (η | −1, i) will dominate the d.f.
statistical dominance. That is, the d.f. G
c
 (η | −1, (i + 1)). Hence, if the true state at period 1 is low and the expert
G
i , his reputation at period 2 will be worse than it would have occurred
induces λ
(i+1) . The opposite will obtain if the true state at period
if he had induced λ
c (η | −1, i) will dominate the d.f.
1 is high. Moreover, if qi < 0.5, the d.f. G
c
i , his future reputation will
 (η | 1, i). In that case, if the expert induces λ
G
improve with respect to the expected current bias if the true state at period 1
is high.
When the difference in the expert’s expected current payoff if he induces
i instead of λ
(i+1) is positive, I will call that difference the expert’s expected
λ
i . Analogously, when the difference in the expert’s
current advantage from λ
(i+1) instead of λ
i is positive, I will call
expected future payoff if he induces λ
(i+1) . When p1
that difference the expert’s expected future advantage from λ

belongs to Qi and qi < 0.5, then the expert’s expected current advantage from
i will never be lower than the difference in the expert’s expected future payoff
λ
i . When p1 = qi , the expert’s expected current
(i+1) instead of λ
if he induces λ
i will be equal to the expert’s expected future advantage from
advantage from λ

i and qi < 0.5, the
λ(i+1) . It means that in equilibrium, when p1 belongs to Q
expert’s reputational concern at period 1 will reduce his incentive to announce
an exaggeratingly low probability that the current state is low. Instead, when
i and qi > 0.5, then the expert’s expected future advantage from
p1 belongs to Q

λi will never be lower than the difference in the expert’s expected current payoff
(i+1) instead of λ
i . When p1 = qi , the expert’s expected future
if he induces λ

advantage from λi will be equal to the expert’s expected current advantage from
(i+1) . It means that in equilibrium, when p1 belongs to Q
i and qi > 0.5, the
λ
expert’s reputational concern at period 1 will partially offset his incentive to
misreport an exaggeratingly high probability that the current state is low. So,
reputational concerns at period 1 will imply a trade-off between two conflicting
purposes:
1) on one side, the current payoff expected by the expert will increase as
the gap between the expert’s current belief and the decision-maker’s posterior
belief at period 1 shrinks. That argument would result in noisy current messages,
inflated towards the tails of the distribution.
2) On the other side, the more extreme are the initial announcements of the
expert, the higher will be his expected future loss driven by a reduced reputation,
when he is sufficiently uncertain about the current state.

17
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Proposition 3 shows that the higher is the variance of η at period 1, the
stronger will be the impact of reputational concerns at period 1 in equilibrium.
 cn will be distributed more evenly than the inn1 , R
So the intervals in Q L
2
1n . From Corollary 1, the initial payoffs expected ex-ante by both
tervals in Q
1
the agents will be maximized if all the intervals in the initial partition have
the same size. It follows that reputational concerns at period 1 can improve
the equilibrium payoff at period 1 expected by both the agents. To sum up,
repeated interaction will make the expert concerned with his future reputation.
As a result, messages at period 1 will be less noisy than they would be in a
single-stage game. All the agents will gain from reputational concerns.

6

Conclusions

The paper is concerned with the repeated interaction between a decision-maker
and an expert of uncertain reliability. The distinctive assumption of the paper
is that the decision-maker makes a subjective assessment of the bias affecting
the true opinions of the expert. The distinctive result of the paper is that
reputational concerns at the first stage will increase the credibility of the initial
messages. Thereby reputational concerns will improve the equilibrium welfare
properties at the initial round of play.

7
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Appendix

Proof. of Proposition 1
From (1):
arg max ED [π2 (ω 2 , a2 ) | ν (m2 )] = [1 − 2ν (m2 )]
A

(11)
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Let 
a2 (ν (m2 )) denote the function mapping agent D’s period-2 posterior probability into his best current action. Hence, if ν (m′2 ) < ν (m′′2 ), then 
a2 (ν (m′2 ))
′′
>
a2 (ν (m2 )).
Since (1 − 2p2 ) = arg maxA EE [π2 (ω2 , a2 ) | p2 ], then, from (11), agent E’s
best choice at the final period, conditional on p2 , will be the announcement of
a message m′2 that solves minm2 |p2 − ν (m2 )|.
Suppose that agent D believes that agent E will report his true belief at
period 2. In that case, agent D’s period-2 beliefs will be such that:
∗

1 if p2 = m2
0 otherwise

β (m2 | p2 ) =

(12)

∗

Let v (m2 ) denote agent D’s period-2 posterior probability that ω 2 is low, under
the system of beliefs in (12).
a) Suppose η2 ∈ (0, 1). From (5):
∗

∗

1 > v (m′′2 ) > v (m′2 ) > 0

∀m′′2 , m′2 : m′′2 > m′2

(13)

∗

and v (m2 ) is invertible. From (3):
l (p′ | −1, ηi )
l (p′′ | −1, ηi )
> 
 if ηi < ηj and p′′ > p′
-)  ′′
l p | −1, ηj
l p′ | −1, ηj

-) (1 − m2 ) H2 l (m2 | −1, η) g2 (η) dη > m2 H2 l (m2 | 1, η) g2 (η) dη if m2 ∈
[0, 0.5).
∗
The last inequality will be reversed if m2 ∈ (0.5, 1]. So v (m2 ) will be greater
than m2 if m2 ∈ [0, 0.5), and it will be lower than m2 if m2 ∈ (0.5, 1]. Then,
∗


p2 − v (m2 ) will be:
∗

-) strictly increasing in m2 if p2 <v (0),

∗ −1
∗
∗
-) zero if m2 = v [p2 ] and p2 ∈ v (0) , v (1) ,
∗

-) strictly decreasing in m2 if p2 > v (1).
Hence, the following period-2
 ∗ message rule will be optimal for agent E:
-) m2 = 0 for every p2 ∈ 0, v (0) ,
∗

∗ −1
∗
-) m2 = v (p2 ) for every p2 ∈ v (0) , v (1) ,

∗
-) m2 = 1 for every p2 ∈ v (1) , 1 .
Accordingly, m2 = p2 for every p2 = {0, 0.5, 1}. Moreover, if two distribution functions, G′2 (η) and G′′2 (η), are such G′2 (η) dominates G′′2 (η) in the
∗
sense of first order stochastic dominance, then v (m2 | g2′ (η)) will be lower than
∗
v (m2 | g2′′ (η)) for every m2 < 0.5; the inequality will be reversed for every
m2 > 0.5.
∗
 b) Suppose
 η2 = 1. From (2) and (4), v (m2 ) = 0.5 for every m2 . Then,
∗


p2 − v (m2 ) will be invariant with respect to m2 , and truthtelling can be supported in equilibrium.
20
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∗

 c) Suppose
 η2 = 0. From (2) and (4), v (m2 ) = m2 for every m2 . Then,
∗


p2 − v (m2 ) will be zero only if m2 = p2 , and truthtelling can be supported in
equilibrium.
Proof. of Proposition 2
a) Consider a set Vn2 with n2 finite and greater than 1. From (13):
∗

∗

1 > v (1) ≥ vn2 > v1 ≥ v (0) > 0

 

Since vi + v(i+1) < v(i+1) + v(i+2) for every i from 1 to (n2 − 2), from (6)
P (Vn2 ) will be a partition with n2 elements such that:
Yi

=

y(i−1) , yi

i = 1, .., n2

y0 = 0

yn2 = 1

(14)

∀i ∈ {1, .., (n2 − 1)}


Let yVn2 denote the corresponding vector y1 , ..., y(n2 −1) .
b) Properties of period-2 equilibria.
b.1) Suppose that in equilibrium at period 2 the equilibrium set Vn2 has
finite cardinality n2 and is supported by the system of equilibrium message
rules {
µ (m2 | p2 )}. I want to show that the elements of the equilibrium set Vn2
are such that:
 
 l (p2 | −1, η) g2 (η) dp2 dη
vi =   H2 Yi
(15)
i [l (p2 | −1, η) + l (p2 | 1, η)] g2 (η) dp2 dη
H2 Y


yi + y(i−1) (1 − η2 ) + η2
=
∀i ∈ {1, .., n2 }
2
i denote the subset of messages inducing vi under Vn2 . Since n2 is finite,
Let M
x . Let M
x+ denote the subset of M
x ,
there must be some vx with non-singular M
collecting all the messages in the support of period-2 equilibrium message rule
x+ is singular, then vx will satisfy (15).
µ
 (m2 | p2 ) conditional on p2 in Yx . If M
x+ to be non-singular. In that case, for every m′2 and m′′2 in M
x+ :
Suppose M
y(i−1)

< yi = 0.5 ν i + ν (i+1)

(16)
ν (m′2 ) − ν (m′′2 ) =

!

′
′′
 (m2 | p2 )
 (m2 | p2 )
β
β
= (1 − η 2 )
p2 
−
dp2
′

 ′′
i
Y
i β (m2 | p2 ) dy
i β (m2 | y) dy
Y
Y
!

µ
 (m′2 | p2 )
µ
 (m′′2 | p2 )


= (1 − η 2 )
p2
−
dp2 = 0
 (m′2 | p2 ) dy
 (m′′2 | y) dy
i
i µ
i µ
Y
Y
Y


"
µ
 (m2 | p2 ) = 1
∀p2 ∈ y(x−1) , yx
(17)
x+
M

Now consider the following modified period-2 message rule:



x+ and p2 ∈
µ
 (m2 | p2 ) = µ
 (m2 | p2 ) ∀ m2 ∈
/M
/ y(x−1) , yx


1
x+ and p2 ∈ y(x−1) , yx
 ∀ m2 ∈ M
µ
 (m2 | p2 ) = 

+
x 
M

(18)

21
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From (17), under (18) :
µ
 (m′2 | p2 )

=
 (m′2 | p2 ) dy
i µ
Y

i
Y

"

x+
M

"

µ
 (m2 | p2 )

x+
M

µ
 (m2 | y) dy



+ and p2 ∈ y(x−1) , yx
∀ m′2 ∈ M
x

Let v (m2 ) denote agent D’s period-2 posterior probability that ω2 is low conx+ and (18). Given m′2 in M
x+ , from (16):
ditional on m2 ∈ M

 dy
[
v (m′2 ) − v (m′2 )] Yi
(1 − η2 )
!
&'
$
%
#
µ
 (m2 | p2 )
µ
 (m′2 | p2 )
−
dp2
=
µ
 (m2 | y) dy
p2 
 (m2 | y) dy
 (m′2 | y) dy
i
i
i µ
i µ
Y
Y
Y
Y
+
′
x \m )
m2 ∈(M
2
= 0
Consequently, if an equilibrium set Vn2 exists, it can be supported by the message rule in (18) that implies (15).
b.2) Suppose η2 ∈ [0, 1) and n2 > 1. From (15), if Vn2 is an equilibrium set,
Vn will satisfy the following conditions:
then the equilibrium vector y
2
Vn is a solution to the system f (yn2 , η2 ) of (n2 − 1) equations where
-) y
2
the representative equation fi (yn2 , η 2 ) is the following:
)
(
y(i−1) + y(i+1) (1 − η2 )
η2
fi (yn2 , η2 ) = yi −
−
=0
(19)
2
(1 + η2 ) (1 + η2 )
with i ∈ {1, ..., (n2 − 1)}, y0 = 0, yn2 = 1.
Vn is such that:
-) y
2

0 < y1 < y2 < ... < y(n2 −2) < y(n2 −1) < 1
(20)




From (19), yi = 1 − y(n2 −i) and, from (16), vi = 1 − v(n2 +1−i) . Hence,
from (20), both P Vn2 and Vn2 will be symmetric around 0.5.

c) Existence of period-2 equilibria.
c.1) Suppose η 2 ∈ [0, 1). I want to show that there exists a unique equilibrium set Vn2 of cardinality n2 for every finite n2 . If n2 = 1, there will be a
unique equilibrium set V1 , with V1 = 0.5, and a unique equilibrium partition
1−η2
P V1 = I (the babbling equilibrium). If n2 > 1, since 2(1+η
is positive,
2)
the system f (yn2 , η2 ) of (n2 − 1) equations from (19) can be written in matrix
notation in the following way:
Zy′n2 = e′
where:



1


1−η2
 −
Z =  2(1+η2 )

0
0

1−η2
− 2(1+η
2)
1
...
0

0
1−η2
− 2(1+η
2)
...
0

(21)
0
0
0
0
...
...
1−η2
0 − 2(1+η
)
2

0
0
0
1







(22)

22
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e′ =

(

η2
η2
1
,
, ...,
1 + η2 1 + η2
2

)

−1
of Z−1 is strictly positive. Hence,
The matrix Z is invertible and every entry zij
n′ 2 = Z−1 e′ . Moreover,
n2 such that y
there will always exist a unique vector y
n2 will satisfy (20). It follows that the solution y
n2 is the unique
the vector y
Vn , thereby simply denoted by y
n2 .
equilibrium vector y
2

Finally, yi − y(i−1) will be decreasing in i for i ≤ n22 if η 2 ∈ (0, 1). If
η2 = 0, then yi = ni2 . Hence, Pn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 2, while Vn2
will be a function of η2 if n2 > 1.
c.2) Suppose η2 = 1. The only equilibrium set is V1 , with V1 = 0.5, and the
unique equilibrium partition is P1 = I.

Proof. of Corollary 1
EE [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] and ED [π 2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] will be equal to:
-) when n2 is an even integer:
, n22 −1


yj y(j+1) y(j+1) − yj
EE [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] = oE + uE
j=1
, n22 −1


ED [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] = oD + uD
yj y(j+1) y(j+1) − yj
j=1
2


(3−η2 )(1+η2 )
2
2
with oE = − 3+η
,
u
=
2
1
−
η
,
o
, and uD = 2 (1 − η2 )2
E
D =−
2
4
4
-) when n2 is an odd integer: (
, n22−1


EE [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] = −1+uE
yj y(j+1) y(j+1) − yj + y n2 −1 1 − y n2 −1
j=1
2
2
(, n2 −1


2
ED [π2 (Vn2 , P (Vn2 ))] = −1+uD
yj y(j+1) y(j+1) − yj + y n2 −1 1 − y n2 −1
j=1

2

2

2

)

2

)

Proof. of Corollary 2
From Proposition 2, Pn2 will be independent of η2 if n2 ≤ 2, while Vn2 will
be independent of η2 if n2 = 1.
n2 with n2 > 2. From (19) and (21) − (22):
Consider R
-) Dy f (
yn2 , η2 ) = Z

′
-) Dη2 f (
yn2 , η 2 ) = −ρ−2 1 − y2 , 1 − y1 − y3 , ..., 1 − y(n2 −3) − y(n2 −1) , −
y(n2 −2) ,
where ρ = (1 + η2 ).
From the implicit function theorem, Df (
yn2 , η2 ) = −Z−1 Dη2 f (
yn2 , η2 ).
n2 is symmetric around 0.5, then:
Since y
d
y 2 −i)
d
yi
-) for every yi < 0.5, (n
= − dη
<0
dη
-) if yi = 0.5,

d
yi
dη 2

2

2

= 0.



d
y(i−1)
d
yi
Moreover, dη
> dη
for i ≤ n22 so that yi − y(i−1) will be decreasing
2
2
in η2 for every i not smaller than 2 and not greater than n22 .
Let F

d
yn2
dη2 , η 2

denote the following system of (n2 − 1) equations where

23
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d
yn2
dη2

the representative equation Fi
Fi

(

d
yn2
,η
dη2 2

)

=−

, η2 is the following:

1 − η2 dy(i−1) dyi 1 − η2 dy(i+1) 1 − y(i−1) − y(i+1)
+
−
−
=0
2ρ
dη2
dη2
2ρ
dη2
ρ2

with i ∈ {1, ..., (n2 − 1)}, y0 = 0, yn2 = 1. It follows that:
d
y
-) D dy F dηn2 , η2 = Z
2

dη 2

d
yn2
dη2 , η 2

=

φ = 1 − ỹ1 − ỹ3 + ρ

d
y1
dη2

-) Dη2 F

d
yn2
dη2

-) DF

2
ρ3

+

dỹ(n2 −2) ′
,
dη2
d
y(n2 −3)
− ỹ(n2 −3) − ỹ(n2 −1) + ρ
dη2

d
y2
1 − ỹ2 + ρ dη
, φ, −ỹ(n2 −2) + ρ

d
y3
dη2

where

2

, ..., 1

, η2 = −Z−1 Dη2 F

+

d
y(n2 −1)
dη2

d
y2
dη2 , η 2
d2 y


2

(n2 −i)
 is symmetric around 0.5, then
Since y
= − ddηy2i > 0 for every
dη22
2
yi < 0.5.
At the end of period
1, the equilibrium
payoff at period 2 expected by agent


n | η , will be equal to:
E, denoted by EE π2 R
2
2
, n22 


 
2
1) −4
yj2 − y(j−1)
(1 − 
vj )2 + yj − y(j−1) 2 − yj − y(j−1) vj2 when
j=1
n2 is an even integer,
, n22−1 −1 


 
2
2) −4
yj2 − y(j−1)
(1 − vj )2 + yj − y(j−1) 2 − yj − y(j−1) vj2 −

j=1

1 − 2
y( n2 −1 −1) when n2 is an odd integer.



n2 | η2 will be strictly
Consequently, if n2 > 1, the function EE π2 R
n )|η ]
δEE [π2 (R
2
2
decreasing and concave in η 2 , with
equal to 0 when η 2 → 0.
δη
2

2

Proof. of Lemma 1
From (1):


nc (m1 ) | λ (m1 ) = [1 − 2λ (m1 )]
arg max ED π1 (ω1 , a1 ) + π
2 R
2
A

Let 
a1 (λ (m1 )) denote the function mapping agent D’s period-1 posterior probability into his best current action. If λ (m′1 ) < λ (m′′1 ), then 
a1 (λ (m′1 )) >
′′

a1 (λ (m1 )).
Suppose that agent D believes that agent E will announce his true belief at
period 1. In that case, agent D’s period-1 beliefs will be such that:
∗

β (m1 | p1 ) =

1 if p1 = m1
0 otherwise

(23)

∗

Let λ (m1 ) denote agent D’s posterior probability at period 1 that ω1 is low
∗

under the system of period-1 beliefs in (23). From (8), λ (m1 ) ∈ (0, 1). Since
l (p | η, ω) is always positive for every positive η and for every ω, then g2 (η | ω1 , m1 )
will never be degenerate under (23) with η2 (ω1 , m1 ) ∈ (0, 1). From (7) and (23):
24
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1
-) η2 (−1, m1 ) = η1 + σ 2 2m11−2m
(1−η 1 )+η1 ,
1
-) η2 (1, m1 ) = η1 − σ2 2(1−m1−2m
1 )(1−η 1 )+η 1
Suppose n2 = 1 (i.e. babbling equilibrium at period 2). From Corollary 2,
the equilibrium payoff at period 2 expected by agent E will be equal to −1.
Hence:
- (
(
))
.
∗

a1 λ (m1 )
+ π 2 R1 | p1
EE π 1 ω 1 , 

.2
-∗
.2
∗
= −4p1 1 − λ (m1 ) − 4 (1 − p1 ) λ (m1 ) − 1

In that case the result of Proposition 1 can be shown to hold with respect to
agent E’s period-1 equilibrium message rule.
n∗ (m1 ) characterize a period-2 equilibrium profile
Suppose n2 > 1. Let R
2
where the posterior generalized probability density functions of η are consistent
with the system of beliefs in (23). In that case:
- (
(
))
.
∗
∗

a1 λ (m1 )
+ π 2 Rn2 (m1 ) | p1 =
EE π 1 ω 1 , 
.2
-∗
.2
∗
−4p1 1 − λ (m1 ) − 4 (1 − p1 ) λ (m1 ) +




n2 (η∗ (−1, m1 )) + (1 − p1 ) EE π 2 R
n2 (η∗ (1, m1 ))
+p1 EE π 2 R
2
2

Hence, at period 1 the sum of the payoffs expected by agent E will be:
a) strictly decreasing in m1 for every p1 in some proper interval [0, p′1 ]
b) strictly increasing in m1 for every p1 in some proper interval [p′′1 , 1].
Consequently, agent D’s period-1 beliefs in (23) will be inconsistent with
agent E’s best period-1 message rule.
Proof. of Lemma 2
From (8):


pβ (m′1 |p)dp+η1

2(1−η1 )

-) λ (m′1 ) =

I

2



I

-) λ (m′1 ) ≥ λ (m′′1 ) if I



β (m′1 |p)dp

pβ (m′1 |p)dp

I

β (m′1 |p)dp
I

β (m′1 |p)dp



≥ I

pβ (m′′
1 |p)dp
β (m′′
1 |p)dp

I

Since |H1 ∩ 0, 1| ≥ 2, then σ2 > 0. From (7):
-) ηc2 (−1, m′1 ) = ηc2 (−1, m′′1 ) ↔ ηc2 (1, m′1 ) = ηc2 (1, m′′1 )
-) ηc2 (−1, m′1 ) < ηc2 (−1, m′′1 ) ↔ ηc2 (1, m′1 ) > ηc2 (1, m′′1 )
-) ηc2 (−1, m′1 ) ≤ ηc2 (−1, m′′1 ) if λ (m′1 ) ≥ λ (m′′1 )
Proof. of Lemma 3
25
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a) Suppose n2 = 1. From Corollary 2, given a set Ln1 , every subset Qi in
(9) will be equal to Q1i in (10). In that case, an analogous version of (14) can
be shown to hold.
 cn is I.
b) Suppose n2 > 1. Given any L1 , the corresponding set Q L1 , R
2
Consider a set Ln1 with n1 ≥ 2. From Corollary 2 and Lemma 2, if λi < λj ,
then:


n (ηc (1, i)) − π 2 R
n (ηc (1, j)) > 0;
-) EE π 2 R
2
2
2
2


n2 (ηc2 (−1, i)) − π2 R
n2 (ηc2 (−1, j)) < 0.
-) EE π 2 R


n2 (ηc2 (ω1 , i)) − π2 R
n2 (ηc2 (ω 1 , j)) .
Let δ (ω 1 , i, j) denote the difference EE π 2 R
.
δ(1,i,j)+4(λ2j −λ2i )
Let H(i, j) denote δ(1,i,j)−δ(−1,i,j)+8(λj −λi ) . Then, H(i, j) ∈ (0, 1) for every
i < j. Let H(i) denote the lowest H(i, j) for every j > i, and let H(i) denote
the highest H(z, i) for every i > z. It follows that:
-) 0 < H(1) ≤ H(n1 ) < 1
-) Q1 = [0, H(1)] and Qn1 = H(n1 ), 1
-) given i in {2, ..., (n1 − 1)}, then Qi = ∅ if H(i) > H(i); Qi = H(i), H(i)
if H(i) ≤ H(i), and H(i) ≤ H(j) if Qi , Qj = ∅ and i < j.
 cn
Consequently, if n1 ≥ 2, for any set Ln1 , the corresponding set Q Ln1 , R
2

will have 2 non-empty elements at least.

Proof. of Proposition 3
 c1 = S
1n .
n1 R
a) Suppose n2 = 1. From Lemma 3, S
1
1 , with L
1 = 0.5 (the
b) Suppose n2 > 1. There always exists a unique L
period-1 babbling equilibrium).
i in L
n1 is induced with posiSuppose that n1 > 1 and in equilibrium each λ
n1 , R
 cn
tive probability. In that case, from Lemma 3, the corresponding set Q L
2
will be a partition with cardinality n1 such that:
1 = [0, H(1)] = [0, H(1, 2)] = [0, q1 ]
-) Q
i = H (i) , H(i) = [H(i − 1, i), H(i, i + 1)] = [
-) Q
qi−1 , qi ] for every i ∈
{2, ..., (n1 − 2)}
n1 = H (n1 ) , 1) = [H(n1 − 1, n1 ), 1] = [
-) Q
qn1 −1 , 1].
Analogously to point b) of the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that:


q

+
q

(1 − η1 ) + η 1
i
(i−1)
i =
i , i ∈ {1, .., n1 }
λ
∀Q
(24)
2
Moreover, in equilibrium:

g1 (η) Qi l (p1 | ω1 , η) dp1
c
g2 (η | ω1 , i) =  
(25)
 i l (p1 | ω 1 , η) g1 (η) dp1 dη
H1 Q
Since l (p | η, ω) is always positive for every positive η and for every ω, and
since |H1 ∩ (0, 1]| ≥ 2, then 
g2c (η | ω 1 , i) in (25) will never be degenerate with
c
η2 (ω 1 , i) ∈ (0, 1).
26
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Consider i < j. From (25):


c
 j l (p1 | ω 1 , η) dp1 H Q
Q
 l(p1 |ω 1 ,η)g1 (η)dp1 dη
1 ,j)
 1 i

-) gg2c(η|ω
=
for every η ∈ H1
 l(p1 |ω 1 ,η)g1 (η)dp1 dη
2 (η|ω 1 ,i)
H
Q
l
(p
|
ω
,
η)
dp
1
j
1
1
1
i
Q
c

c

(η z |−1,j)
(η z |−1,i)
-) gg2c (η
> gg2c (η
for every ηz , ηk ∈ H1 , for every ηz < ηk .
k |−1,j)
k |−1,i)
2
2
The last inequality will be reversed if ω 1 = 1. It follows that ηc2 (−1, j) <
c
η2 (−1, i) and ηc2 (1, j) > η c2 (1, i). In particular:
1−
q(i−1) −
qi
-) ηc2 (−1, i) = η1 + σ2 q
,
( (i−1) +qi )(1−η1 )+η1
1−
q(i−1) −
qi
-) ηc2 (1, i) = η 1 − σ 2 2−q
.
( (i−1) −qi )(1−η1 )+η1
c
c
So, when i < j, then η2 (1, i) < η2 (1, j) ≤ η 1 ≤ ηc2 (−1, j) < ηc2 (−1, i) if
qj ≤ 0.5, while ηc2 (−1, j) < η c2 (−1, i) ≤ η 1 ≤ η c2 (1, i) < ηc2 (1, j) if q(i−1) ≥ 0.5.
Finally:

ηc2 (1, i) = ηc2 (−1, j) and ηc2 (−1, i) = η c2 (1, j)
if q(i−1) = 1 − qj and qi = 1 − q(j−1)

(26)

n1 is the support of agent E’s period-1 equilibrium
b.1) If n1 > 1 and L
Ln = (
q1 , ..., qn1 −1 ) will
message rules, the corresponding equilibrium vector q
1
satisfy the following conditions:
  is a solution to the system h (qn1 , z) of (n1 − 1) equations where
-) q
 Ln21 
z = η1 , σ , and the representative equation hi (qn1 , z) is the following:
- 


.
2 1 − η21 q(i+1) − q(i−1) − δ (−1, i, (i + 1))
hi (qn1 , z) =
qi +
(27)
+δ (1, i, (i + 1))




− (1 − η1 )2 q(i+1) − q(i−1) q(i−1) − (1 − η1 )2 q(i+1) − q(i−1) q(i+1) +


−2 (1 − η1 ) q(i+1) − q(i−1) η1 − δ (1, i, (i + 1)) = 0
with i ∈ {1, ..., (n1 − 1)}, q0 = 0, qn1 = 1.
Ln is such that:
-) q
1

0 < q1 < q2 < .... < q(n1 −2) < q(n1 −1) < 1

(28)



i = 1 − λ
(n +1−i) .
From (27) and (26), qi = 1 − q(n1 −1) , and, from (24), λ
1
n will be symmetric around 0.5.
n1 , R
 cn and L
Hence, from (28), both Q L
1
2
b.2) Every hi (qn1 , z) in (27) can be written in the following way:

qi δ (−1, i, (i + 1)) + (1 − qi ) δ (1, i, (i + 1))
(29)
(
)

 q(i+1) + q(i−1)
= −2 (1 − η1 ) q(i+1) − q(i−1)
(1 − η1 ) + η1 − qi (1 + η1 )
2

Suppose n1 = 2. The RHS in (29) will be equal to zero if q1 = 0.5. From (26),
if q1 = 0.5, the LHS in (29) will be equal to zero. Hence, q1 = 0.5 is the unique
solution to the system in (27).
27
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Suppose n1 > 2. Consider qi < 0.5. Then, η c2 (−1, i) > ηc2 (−1, (i + 1)) ≥
+ 1)) > ηc2 (1, i). So, ηc2 (ω1 , (i + 1)) can be written as it follows:

ηc2 (1, (i

ηc2 (−1, (i + 1)) = xηc2 (−1, i) + (1 − x) ηc2 (1, i)
ηc2 (1, (i + 1)) = zηc2 (−1, i) + (1 − z) ηc2 (1, i)

(30)

From Corollary
2:


n (ηc (1, i)) − π 2 R
n (ηc (−1, i)) > 0. Let that difference
-) EE π 2 R
2
2
2
2
be denoted by w.
λi +λ(i+1)
-) if qi is equal to
, the LHS in (29) will be strictly lower than
2
w [−qi (1 − x) + (1 − qi ) z], that is negative from (30). Instead, the RHS in
(29) will be equal to zero. It follows that in equilibrium qi will be lower than
λi +λ(i+1)
for every qi lower than 0.5.
2
b.3) Let z̈ = (η1 , 0), and let q̈n1 be such that hi (q̈n1 , z̈) = 0 for every
i ∈ {1, ..., (n1 − 1)}. From the proof of Proposition 2, q̈n1 exists and is unique.
Moreover, from (27), the following matrix Dqn1 h (q̈n1 , z̈) is invertible:



γ q̈2
ǫq̈2
0
0
0
0
 ǫ (q̈3 − q̈1 ) γ (q̈3 − q̈1 ) ǫ (q̈3 − q̈1 ) 0

0
0

Dqn1 h (q̈n1 , z̈) = 


0
...
...
...
...
0




0
0
0
0 ǫ 1 − q̈(n1 −2) γ 1 − q̈(n1 −2)


2
where: γ = 2 1 − η21 and ǫ = − (1 − η 1 ) . Since:
− q̈1 ϑδ(−1,1,2)
− (1 − q̈1 ) ϑδ(1,1,2)
ϑσ 2
ϑσ2

ϑδ(1,2,3)
ϑδ(−1,2,3)

−
(1
−
q̈
−
q̈
2)
2
2
ϑσ
ϑσ2
Dσ2 h (q̈n1 , z̈) = 
...



1 −1),n1 )
1 −1),n1 )
− 1 − q̈(n1 −1) ϑδ(1,(nϑσ
− q̈(n1 −1) ϑδ(−1,(n
2
ϑσ2
−1





,


dq̈i
then Dh (q̈n1 , z̈) = − Dqn1 h (q̈n1 , z̈)
Dσ2 h (q̈n1 , z̈). Hence, dσ
2 < 0 for
every q̈i < 0.5.
b.4) Let t = (η1 , η1 (1 − η1 )), where η1 (1 − η1 ) is the greatest variance

compatible with η1 . Consider ṫ = (0, 0) and let q̇n1 be such that hi q̇n1 , ṫ = 0
for every i ∈ {1, ..., (n1 − 1)}. From the proof of Proposition 2, q̇n1 exists and
is unique. Moreover, every q̇i in q̇n1 is equal to ni1 . Let r denote n11 . The


following matrix Dqn1 h q̇n1 , ṫ is invertible:


4r −2r
0
0
0
0

  −2r 4r −2r 0


0
0 
. Since Dη h q̇n1 , ṫ =
Dqn1 h q̇n1 , ṫ = 
1
 0

...
... ... ...
0
0
0
0
0
−2r
4r


−4r2 (n1 − 2)
 −4r2 (n1 − 4) 







, then Dh q̇n1 , ṫ = − Dqn h q̇n1 , ṫ −1 Dη h q̇n1 , ṫ . Hence
1


1
...
−4r2 (2 − n1 )
dq̇i
> 0 for every q̇i lower than 0.5. From b.2) and b.3), in equilibrium
dη
1
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qi ∈

(
)
 +λ

λ
r, i 2(i+1) .

c) Let Ei [π1 (Ln1 , Q (Ln1 ))] denote the payoff at period 1 expected ex-ante
by agent i in the case of a partition Q (Ln1 ) with each λi in Ln1 satisfying (24).
From Corollary 1, both the agents’ expected payoffs will be maximized if each
qi is equal to ni1 . Since η1 ∈ (0, 1), from b.3) and b.4):
.




i
1
n R
c

1 S
>
E
π

S
Ej π1 (Ln1 , Q (Ln1 )) | qi =
∀i
> Ej π
j
1
1
n2
n1
n1
∀j = E, D if n1 > 2, n2 > 1
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